If a person sends a work related e-mail – but sets the send time to be delayed until after one has left the office – is this considered gezel daas.

Answer:

If one is going to gain a benefit from this, for instance, if one’s boss will think that you are working overtime, and showing great dedication to your job, whereas in actual fact it was done in office hours, there it will involve geneivas daas.

As several cases in the Gemara show, geneivas daas applies where a person gain benefit or any type by means of misrepresentation. This applies even when a person (for instance) invites someone, in the know that the invitee will refuse, only to make a good impression. The same will apply to the case in point.

Best wishes.

Is a married Jewish woman allowed to expose ervah in front of a goyishe man? What about uncovering her hair? Also can a married Jewish woman make a berocha with her hair uncovered?

Answer:

It is permitted for a woman to uncover her hair in front of a non-Jewish man, of course where there is a legitimate reason for doing so (such as going to the hairdresser).

The same will apply for an ervah: There is less severity in exposure in front of a non-Jew, but of course this will only apply to cases of need, such as a doctor, and so on.

For reciting a berachah with uncovered hair, please see here.

Sources:

There is some debate among poskim concerning going to a Jewish hairdresser (for instance), which is due to the man being obligation to avoid any hirhur, and who is liable to transgress the prohibition of velo tasuru acharei … eineichem.

For a non-Jewish hairdresser, this does not apply, and therefore there would not be any prohibition for a woman to go to a non-Jewish hairdresser.

The same applies to an ervah, provided the circumstances require it, such as a doctor or similar charge.

Having said all of this, it remains a virtue for married ladies to go to a female practitioners, but this preference is deferred by other considerations.

I was amazed to hear recently on a shiur (by a very Orthodox Sephardic Rabbi) that there exists a custom, among some, to pray Mincha twice.

Google would seem to indicate that this is, in fact, a custom. (See, for example: http://chabadtalk.com/forum/showthread.php3?t=11723).

Firstly:

i) Isn’t there a problem here of saying Berachot le’vatalah.

ii) I had heard that you could technically pray as many times as you wanted in a day so long as you were m’hadesh (adding something new) to each prayer. But if the same mincha is prayed twice, one isn’t relying on this dispensation…

Finally, why don’t we say the same for Shachris and Arvit also?

Surely the same logic of offering a ‘voluntary korban’ applies equally as much to those tefilot?

Thanks in advance.

Answer:

The question of saying berachos levatalah depends on whether it is permitted to daven again or not.

As you rightfully note, there is a concept of davening a tefillas nedavah, and if one’s intention is to daven a nedavah (a voluntary prayer), it is permitted to pray twice.

Although this applies throughout the day (a person can pray a nedavah prayer whenever he wishes to), the Tur (Orach Chaim 234; also cited by the Shulchan Aruch) does mention the idea of someone prayer mincha gedolah praying again at the time of minchah ketanah. This is in order to achieve the added virtue of praying at the later time.

However, one who wishes to daven a nedavah prayer must add a chidush, and without doing so, it is not permitted to daven twice. The Tur adds that aside for making a chiddush in the prayer, only a person who is confident of being able to have proper intent thoughout the prayer should daven a nedavah prayer, and otherwise it is said of him: “Why do I require your many offerings?”

See also Aruch Ha-Shulchan 107:5; Mishnah Berurah 234:4.

Shalom!
Questions in regards to shabbat bread.
1)I baked a bread for shabbat, but challa is not separated (just 8 cups of flour used). Can I serve a bread for bracha when challa is not separated?
2)Can i use for bracha not whole bread (for example- 2 slices of bread?)
3)If I served 2 breads for Friday night,can I use leftovers for the kiddush on the next day? Or this is a must to serve Friday night 2 whole breads and the next day 2 whole breads?

Tnx, Shabbat Shalom

Answer:

1) I don’t know what size cups you used. If the amount was more than 2 2/3 pounds of flour, then challah must be separated from the dough. If challah was not separated, outside of Israel the challah can be eaten on Shabbos where there is a need for it, but some must be left as a separation for after Shabbos.

2) For the berachah on Shabbos one should use specifically whole breads (Orach Chaim 274:1).

An interesting opinion, however, is the ruling of the Netziv in Shut Meishiv Davar (no. 21). The Netziv was asked to justify the custom of his grandfather, Rav ‘Itzaleh of Volozin, who used to give two pieces of challah to latecomers at the meal, rather than give them whole loaves. How was the mitzvah fulfilled with slices or pieces of bread?

The Netziv explains that the mitzvah can, in fact, be fulfilled with slices of bread, provided that they were not sliced or cut in front of the person making the berachah. ‘Wholeness,’ according to the Netziv, is a relative virtue: If I receive a sliced of bread, the slice is considered ‘whole’ until it is cut further.

Other poskim (see Shut Harerei Kedem Vol. 2, no. 89) have not accepted the chiddush of the Netziv, and it should not generally be relied on. Yet, the Minchas Yitzchak (Vol. 3, no. 13) writes that somebody making Kiddush on cake can rely on this ruling, in reciting the berachah over two slices of cake.

Certainly, where there is no whole loaf available, one may and must fulfill the mitzvah with two slices of challah (Aruch Ha-Shulchan 274:5)

3) Two whole loaves should be used for every meal.

SWIPE YOUR VISA,

NOT YOUR MASTERCARD

והארץ לא תמכר לצמיתות כי לי הארץ כי גרים ותושבים אתם עמדי

The land shall not be sold in perpetuity for the the land is mine, for you are sojourners and citizens with Me

The Land of Israel is unique. Each tribe is assigned a region, each family a domain, and never can that piece of designated property be entirely removed from the realm of their ownership. While inherited land may be sold to others, the property automatically reverts to its original recipient come the semicentennial Jubilee Year.

Why?

As the Torah tells it, the reason is simple: “For you are sojourners and citizens with me”.

And yet, we remain perplexed. Are we sojourners, or are we citizens? And how can the fact that we are one, the other, or both, explain why land cannot be sold indefinitely?

Sojourners. That one seems easy. The land is God’s, we are merely temporary citizens, and God wants to remind us of that by forbidding us to acquire land forever.

But citizens? That can’t be a reason why not to buy land, can it?

Of course not. Obviously, it is instead a reason why we cannot sell the land God has assigned our respective families. We are citizens, and must remain citizens, of the land God has apportioned us.

And so we learn that we are citizens in our designated land, and must be nothing more than sojourners in any land other than ours.

Any message there?

Certainly.

The land we are assigned, is the land upon which God has determined we can best achieve our spiritual goals. Tailor-made to suit our soul, it is land we must never leave for an extended period of time, lest we forfeit the opportunity to attain perfection. Any other land, on the other hand, can at best provide for our physical needs for a given time, and no more.

We are neither prohibited from tending to those physical needs, nor from absenting ourselves temporarily from our spiritual needs. We are prohibited, however, from turning God’s plan on its head.

We can, and indeed must, be citizens of spirituality sojourning through physicality, yet we dare not sojourn through the spiritual while residing in the physical.

And its not about the time. Fifty years is no short leave of absence, yet infinity is infinitely longer. God may be generous with visas, but He is positively stingy when it comes to citizenship renunciation.

The flag we fly must be that of spiritual perfection, even as it remains temporarily planted in the earth of earthly survival. Our anthem must sing the praises of morality, even as we are compelled to occasionally dance to the tune of practicality.

Because we are what we must become, even as we do what we have to do.

This week’s parashah, Parashas Bechukosai, mentions the concept of a cherem in the context of a dedication to Hashem. As Rashi notes, the Sages dispute the status of something that is dedicated, where the object of the dedication is unspecified. According to one opinion, the dedicated item is given to the Kohanim; according to another, it goes to the Temple itself.

In common usage, however, the term cherem refers not to a dedication, but rather to a ban, or excommunication. The two meanings are certainly related: Just as something dedicated to Hashem is by definition separated from our regular mundane (chulin) lives, so a person who is excommunicated is separated from the community. In practice, however, the connotation is quite different.

We find in Scripture that the concept of a cherem can actually imply punishment by death (see Shmos 22:19). In the language of Chazal and in modern usage, a cherem does not imply physical death, but it can perhaps be described as social or spiritual death. Indeed, Chazal write that the word shamta (Aramaic for excommunication) derives from the words sham misah – “there death is found” – and the mourning practices that the excommunicated person must follow (such as the prohibitions on washing and on haircuts) suggest that he must mourn his own death.

In this and in the following article we will, please G-d, discuss the nature of the ban and its laws. For which issues is this penalty applied? What defines a halachic ban, and what are its effects? How and by whom is the ban issued, and how is it lifted? This week’s article will give an overview of the use of the halachic ban and its general nature.

Be’eizer Hashem, next week’s article will detail practical examples of the halachic ban (for instance, the famous bans issued by Rabbeinu Gershom), and show how the issue is relevant nowadays.

The Honor of the Sages

It is worth outlining the general use of the ban over the generations, and in particular in the times of Chazal.

In numerous sources, we find that the ban was used primarily as an internal community sanction. In the words of the Sefer Chasidim (No. 1386), “In our times there is no sanction among Israel other than the oath and the ban.” In the times of the Mishnah and the Talmud, and more so in later generations, the jurisdiction of Torah authorities was very limited, and the strongest sanction they had was the rabbinic ban.

One of the most common matters for which the ban was used is to protect the honor and the authority of the Sages. This use of the ban in this context is mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi (Berachos 19a): “In twenty-four places Beis Din excommunicate for the honor of the Sages.” As the Gemara writes, the ban takes on special stringency in punishing those who show scorn and disrespect towards the Sages – a principle that is likewise noted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 334:43).

Similarly, during the Tanaic period the ban was used to guard the authority of the leadership, and to ensure that halachic decisions were respected. The most prominent example is the renowned case of tanur shel achna’i (Bava Metzia 59b), in which Raban Gamliel excommunicated Rabbi Eliezer for his refusal to accept the majority opinion of the Sages.

The Gemara narrates how the ban caused Rabbi Eliezer much anguish. Raban Gamliel, when he later traveled at sea, found his life endangered by a fierce storm. Understanding that he was experiencing this danger on account of the suffering the ban had inflicted upon Rabbi Eliezer, Raban Gamliel turned to Heaven and declared: “Master of the world, it is known before You that I did not act for my own glory… but for Yours – that there should not be many disputes among Israel.”

Chazal see the preservation of the Sages’ honor, and the uniformity of halachic decision, as ideas that are foundational to Torah practice. Even Rabbi Akavia ben Mehalalel, who was a candidate for the leading position of Av Beis Din, was placed into excommunication for his dispute against the Sages (Mishnah, Eduyos 5:6). In this way, the ban protects the stability of halachah.

Excommunication for Halachic Transgression

Chazal record several instances where bans were used as sanctions against sinners.

Rav Achai excommunicated somebody who went fishing on Shabbos (Kiddushin 72b), and Rav Yosef excommunicated a fellow sage who travelled on the second day of Yom Tov (Pesachim 52a). The Gemara adds a general ruling whereby anybody who desecrates the sanctity of the second day of Yom Tov should be placed into excommunication. Elsewhere it mentions that the same applies to one who labors on the eve of Pesach. The Talmud recounts other instances where bans were enacted in reaction to particular sins.

Though bans had other purposes as well, the Talmudic examples of bans indicate that the sanction was used especially to deter sins that involve damage to halachic practice in society.

With this in mind, we can understand the ruling of the Ran, who discussed which sins the punishment of excommunication should be applied to. The Ran (Pesachim 50a) explains that a ban should be applied to transgressions of rabbinic nature, but not to Torah transgressions. Rabbinic transgressions, though in themselves less severe than Torah transgressions, carry a greater threat to religious practice of society as a whole. In questions of Torah law, the Sages were less concerned that transgression would influence the sinner’s surroundings.

The Meiri notes that the distinction is not universal, and the Maharam (cited in Tosafos, Yevamos 52b) notes the general principle, namely: “Everything depends on the needs of the hour, and the judge has the discretion to change from one case to another.” Yet in the majority of cases, the distinction of the Ran is correct.

We also find that Chazal made use of excommunication for sins that have a public nature. One who says the Name of Hashem in vain (Nedarim 7b), one who plants kilayim (Kiddushin 39a), and one who betroths a woman within three months of her divorce (Yevamos 37a), are all singled out for excommunication. The public nature of these sins threatens the “purity of the public domain,” and it is fitting to treat them with special severity.

What is a Cherem?

The basic concept of a cherem is the separation of the excommunicated party from the community. One source (Yerushalmi, Mo’ed Katan 2b) bases the idea on the words of the verse in Ezra (10:8): “Anyone who will fail to appear within three days will forfeit all his property… and will himself be expelled from the assembly of the exiles.”

It is forbidden for anybody to enter within four cubits of the excommunicated person (based on Bava Metzia 59b), and the person in cherem must follow the laws of mourning on account of his social death.

Yet, excommunication does not imply the total banishment of the person from society. The Mishnah (Midos 2:2) notes that there was a separate entrance to the Temple Mount for those in excommunication, indicating that the party would be separate but not banished from the Temple Mount. Entry into the Sanctuary (azarah) was prohibited (Berachos 19b), but not entry into the Temple Mount.

One of the most severe consequences of excommunication is the banning of the person from the beis midrash. As we find in Maseches Semachos (5:14), a person under ban may not teach and he is not taught. However, he may study on his own, “so that he should not forget his learning.” The observance of mourning by somebody under a ban is thus not complete, for he may study Torah, yet he cannot enter the communal study hall.

In certain cases, the cherem closes many doors besides those of the beis midrash. One enactment, which was made in the sixteenth century, decrees that somebody who transgresses will be excommunicated from “both worlds,” separated from “all holiness of Israel,” “his bread is the bread of a non-Jew, and his wine forbidden,” and his burial should be “the burial of an ass.” It was prohibited for any rabbi to officiate at his or his children’s weddings, and “he should be cursed with all the curses written in the Torah and the curses of Elisha upon Gechazi” (the full text is cited in Pinkas Va’ad Arba Aratzos, p. 1).

Further details of the laws of somebody placed in cherem will be discussed in the forthcoming article.

The Power of the Cherem

Does the halachic ban carry the weight of Torah law, or it is only a rabbinic enactment? The Ramban discusses this question at length in his Mishpat Ha-Cherem, where he concludes that it is rabbinic, since it is derived from a verse in Shoftim (5:23; the cherem is thus mi-divrei kabbalah) rather than a Torah verse.

The Ramban notes that one cannot explain that the idea of a ban is based upon the laws of Torah vows, for this would leave us without an explanation of how a person is released from the cherem, despite the lack of a petach or charatah (regret) as is necessary in the case of vows. The Ramban writes that a ban is unrelated to other Torah laws, and it is rather, “Beis din declaring a ban for some reason, stating that anybody who does such and such, and anybody who breaks the boundary on a particular issue, should be in cherem.”

Based on his definition, the Ramban explains that there are four matters for which the ban will be more stringent than regular vows: (1) It does not have to be stated explicitly; (2) It applies against a person’s will, and in his absence; (3) One who transgresses it is separated from the community, as the way of a niduy (excommunication) and worse; (4) The ban can involve the death penalty (when proclaimed by the King).

Conversely, in matters of releasing a person from a ban, the cherem is more lenient than vows and oaths.

Doubtful Cherem

Not all authorities agree with the Ramban concerning the status of the halachic ban. According to the Terumas Ha-Deshen (281), the ban is a Torah law, and this is also asserted by the Noda Biyhuda (Even Ha-Ezer 77) concerning the bans of Rabbeinu Gershom. Elsewhere, however, the Noda Biyhuda (Yoreh De’ah 146) states that the cherem is only of rabbinic origin, citing the above Ramban.

Based on this assertion, the Noda Biyhuda writes that in cases of doubt – meaning, in cases where there is a doubt as to whether a ban should apply or not – one can be lenient.

The Sedei Chemed (Ches, Kelal 42) writes at length concerning the status of a cherem, and concludes that even if we are stringent concerning doubts about a cherem, this will apply only to doubt concerning whether a ban should be applied or not. The actual halahchos of the ban (how the banned party must act and be treated) are certainly rabbinic, and we are certainly lenient concerning doubts as to such practices.

In the next article we will discuss the particular halachos of bans in more detail, and deal in particular with the bans enacted by Rabbeinu Gershom.

In Hilchos Challah Siman 329 Sif Beis the machaber paskens that if one made a dough to be cooked then it’s patur from challah. The Shach however argues and says that many poskim don’t hold like this and therefore one should be mafrish without a bracha. What about if someone had such a dough that they prepared, cooked, and never took Challah from and now it’s Shabbos. What should be done now? Can they be somach on the Machaber in such a case? Should they be mafrish with a katan? Can they be mafrish themselves even since maybe it’s only a chumrah?

Answer:

Challah must not be taken on Shabbos, even where this is a stringency.

As poskim write, challah today is rabbinic, and therefore for matters of doubt one can be lenient, and where there is a need the cooked dough can be eaten on Shabbos. [This is true in spite of the fact that it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin after Shabbos.]

One should preferable leave some of the cooked dough for after Shabbos, as the ruling outside Israel where bread can be eaten on Shabbos, and some left for after Shabbos for purposes of challah.

I have 3 students who are having a big disagreement. Student A was arranging a Paintball game for the senior class. He was not doing it to make a profit but as a bonding event there. He pre bought 36 spots at a local place and was reselling them at cost to his fellow students. he sold them on condition that they could have a refund up to the week of the event and after that time it was up to purchaser to find a replacement. He refunded people up to the week of the event but within the week he did not. Student B phones him one hour before the event and told him that something came up and he could not go and would not be filling the spot. Student A was left with an open spot tried calling around to find someone to use it. Student A offered Student C to come for free and Student C agreed to come but on condition that he did not need to pay (student C declined coming weeks before because it was too expensive). Now student B feels that Student C benefited from his ticket and wants B to pay him directly. Was the space still Student B’s since he was not refunded for it and did student A have the right to give it to C? Does Student C have any liability? It does not help the situation that Student A and C do not like each other.
Thanks -Stephen Berger

Answer:

It appears that Student C and Student A have no obligation to reimburse Student B for the ticket, and Student B does not have any claim for payment.

The reason for this is that Student A clearly stipulated that no re-fund would be given for somebody returning the ticket within the week of the event. Student A is therefore not obligated to give a refund.

As for Student C, his obligation to pay will be based only on the benefit he derived from the event. This is a case of “zeh neheneh ve-zeh lo chaser” — Student C is deriving benefit and Student A is not losing anything — and therefore he is not obligated to pay.

Therefore, Student B does not have a claim against either students.

Best wishes.

I was told before Pesach that flour in a closed package (a regular 1 kilo sack) is not chametz and to throw it out is ba’al tashchis. I put 2 sacks in a cupboard with kitniyos (I do not sell real chametz) that was locked over Pesach. I have not yet got a psak on the status of the flour. Should I throw it out?

Answer:

There is no need to throw it out.

Some prefer not to keep flour over Pesach, for fear that the processing before packaging will cause it to be chametz. However, this is only a slight concern for chametz, and therefore there is no need for stringency concerning the prohibition of chametz after Pesach.

Thanks for a wonderful resource. In regards to one’s own mitzvah of learning kol haTorah. What is the “Shiur” of the mitzvah. In this link (http://www.dinonline.org/2012/04/23/talmud-torah/) Rabbi Rosenthal mentions that the mitzvah of teaching a son kol haTorah was “This includes: Torah, Nevi’im, Kesuvim, all of the halachos based on the pesukim, the explanations and reasons of the Taryag mitzvos, all of the Agadaic drashos of the pesukim, the Mishnayos and Braisos and the Gemaros that explain them.” However the obligation today is only Chumash, “and to see to it that the child becomes self-proficient in learning Gemara and halacha. Since both Torah she’bichsav and Torah she’baal peh are readily accessible, a child can be expected to learn them on his own once he has the basic tools for learning and comprehension (Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Hilchos Talmud Torah, chapter 1).”

This seems to imply that this leniency is only in regards to what needs to be taught to the son. However the obligation of each person remains the same at “Torah, Nevi’im, Kesuvim, all of the halachos based on the pessukim, the explanations and reasons of the Taryag mitzvos, all of the Agadaic drashos of the pessukim, the Mishnayos and Braisos and the Gemaros that explain them.”

Is my understanding correct?

L’Maasheh what level of “knowing” is required:

re: Tanach- do you have to know every passuk, it’s targum, and every midrash on it?

re: Halachah- he said “halachos based on pesukim” – does that mean only the mitzvos d’oraysah? Asmachtah?

re: Mishnayos,beraysos, Gemara – do you need to know every mishnah,beraysah, gemara by heart?

Or has this changed b’zman hazeh that things are written down? Is it sufficient to know where to look to find answers to questions, or must one know it by heart? (this Q applies to all learning above)

Lastly, how is it possible to fulfill this Mitzvah. The Rambam seems to imply that you have not fulfilled this mitzvah until you’ve completed this. However this would seem to be something that very few if any individuals can achieve.

thanks so much,
Chaim

Answer:

Chazal, and poskim in general, do not speak about the obligation to know the Torah, but rather the obligation to study the Torah. The obligation to know the Torah is mentioned as the purpose of the obligation to study the Torah, but not as an “independent” obligation.

The Rambam, for instance, writes that a person must study the Torah until the day of his death, for fear of forgetting his knowledge.

In terms of the obligation to study the Torah, Chazal write that one should divide his time between Scripture, Mishnah, and Gemara. Please see our article here where we discuss how these divisions apply today. The article also discusses the obligation of knowing the Torah by comparison with the obligation of study.

The most basic purpose of the Torah is to teach us how to act, and therefore preference is given to practical matters.

Rabbi Rosental’s statement whereby there is a mitzvah of teaching one’s son the entire Torah, including “Torah, Nevi’im, Kesuvim, all of the halachos based on the pesukim, the explanations and reasons of the Taryag mitzvos, all of the Agadaic drashos of the pesukim, the Mishnayos and Braisos and the Gemaros that explain them,” only means that until one knows everything, there is no exemption from the study of Torah. In fact, even after one knows everything, there is no exemption, as noted above, for if you don’t study, you forget.

However, even if one doesn’t finish everything, there is no transgression, and the only transgression is for those who fail to meet the obligation to study Torah.